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Leeway for the loyal: a model of employee discretion 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the factors underlying task discretion from an economist‟s 
perspective. It argues that the key axis for understanding discretion is the trade-off 
between the positive effects of discretion on potential output per employee and the 
negative effects of greater leeway on work effort. In empirical analysis using matched 
employer-employee data it is shown that discretion is strongly affected by the level of 
employee commitment. In addition discretion is generally greater in high-skilled jobs, 
though not without exceptions, and lower where employees are under-skilled. 
Homeworking and flexitime policies raise employee discretion. The impact of 
teamworking is mixed. In about half of cases team members do not jointly decide 
about work matters, and the net effect of teams on task discretion in these cases is 
negative. In other cases, where team members do decide matters jointly, the impact is 
found to be neutral according to employees‟ perceptions, or positive according to 
managers‟ perceptions. There are also significant and substantial unobserved 
establishment-level factors which affect task discretion. 
 
 
Leeway for the loyal: a model of employee discretion. 
1. Introduction. 
This paper examines the design of jobs from an economic perspective, with a focus on 
employees‟ autonomy. While worker autonomy has been central both to sociology‟s 
class-based analyses of work (Braverman, 1974), and to psychology‟s demand-control 
model of job satisfaction and stress (Karasek, 1979), neoclassical economics 
traditionally placed no emphasis on the subject. Economics preferred to leave issues of 
job design and work organisation to the “black box” of technical processes taking place 
inside the workplace. Yet in recent decades the extent to which employees are free to 
decide matters concerning their job tasks has come to be seen as important in several 
strands of modern economic theory, which sees the worker-boss relationship as an 
example of a principal-agent problem. The location of influence over production 
decisions is an issue for the design of optimal incentive structures (e.g. Athey and 
Roberts, 2001) or for the distribution of power (e.g. Guy and Skott, 2005), depending 
on one‟s perspective; it is an implicit or explicit ingredient in efficiency-wage models. 
Workplace autonomy is also a highly valued job feature in itself, being a major factor 
underpinning workers‟ intrinsic job satisfaction as proposed both in an earlier literature 
on job design (e.g. Davis, 1966; Cooper 1973) and in more recent studies of job 
satisfaction (Harley, 2001; Green and Tstitsianis, 2005). There is, moreover, indirect 
evidence of a high demand for autonomy, in observed studies of the demand for self-
employment status. Although the latter is constrained by credit and cost restrictions, the 
desire for autonomy is frequently given as a major reason for wanting self-employment 
(Taylor, 1996; Clinton et al., 2006).  
The particular aspect of autonomy upon which this paper concentrates is the level of 
personal influence or discretion over the tasks that employees do in their own jobs, 
referred to as “task discretion”. This aspect is distinct from any influence that might be 
afforded to the teams in which employees might work, and from broader forms of 
participation in organisation-wide decision making, whether through works councils, 
trade unions or other communication channels.  
The need for an understanding of task discretion is heightened by the discovery that its 
average level fell considerably in Britain throughout the 1990s (and was probably 
declining since at least the mid 1980s). By contrast, participation in decision-making at 
 2 
establishment level, which is affected by different factors and is arguably less important 
than task discretion for employee well-being, appears to have grown somewhat more 
widespread among British establishments over this period (Felstead et al, 2002: 67-8; 
Gallie et al, 2004; Millward et al., 2000). The 1990s fall in task discretion in Britain 
hardly conforms to the paradigm of Post-Fordism and has yet to be adequately 
explained. The fall contrasts with modest rises in task autonomy in Finland and in 
Norway during both the 1980s and 1990s (Lehto and Sutela, 1999, 2005; Leiulfsrud 
and Dahl, 2005), while in Sweden there were increases from at least 1975 until the 
1990s, at the end of which some declines of decision latitude are reported (Theorell, 
2004; Vogel and Theorell, 2006). While comparisons of autonomy levels between 
nations are subject to possible biases, in 2006 workers in the UK are reported to have 
an average amount of autonomy, according to the European Working Conditions 
Survey, while all the Scandinavian countries rank much more highly (European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007). 
Task discretion is only implicitly incorporated within economists‟ empirical 
investigations of efficiency wage models, which have focused on the behavioural 
implications of the principal-agent nexus for productivity, wages, or work effort. 
Authors in this tradition have only rarely attempted to weave direct measures of 
workplace autonomy into their tests of model predictions. Bryson and Freeman (2007) 
is a rare exception, in which it is found that the impact on productivity of certain 
combinations of “fair share capitalism” is somewhat larger in workplaces that devolve 
greater autonomy in decision-making to their employees. Empirical research on job 
design, and attendant studies of autonomy in jobs, have largely been carried out on 
small scale samples or in single case studies, by occupational psychologists with rather 
different objectives to those of economists. Consequently relatively little is known 
about the characteristics of firms, jobs and workers that are associated with high or low 
levels of autonomy – factors which might be thought relevant to a better understanding 
of the formation of labour contracts. Moreover, the determination of autonomy has only 
rarely been considered in the context of a profit-maximising model of the firm.  
What, then, determines the amount of autonomy afforded to workers? The answer, I 
propose in this paper, is derived from post-Fordism, and is linked to the related issue of 
workers‟ commitment to the organisation. I use the term „post-Fordism‟ here as a short-
hand for the proposition that, in contrast to the technologies and power structures of 
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earlier generations, prevailing modern technologies are such that relatively dense local 
decision-making (by workers themselves, individually or in teams) is efficient up to a 
point: it therefore profits employers to allow employees some leeway in their jobs. But 
employers also face the fundamental post-Fordist dilemma that leeway permits self-
interested employees to take advantage and work less hard.
1
 Autonomy can be more 
effectively granted, therefore, to those workers that are less likely to behave 
opportunistically – that is, those whose preferences are to identify with the company‟s 
objectives, share its values, and to show loyalty. Leeway is thus for the loyal, not for a 
purely self-interested homo economicus. The centrality of a key role for affective 
commitment is this paper‟s core hypothesis. 
Recent large-scale empirical studies of worker autonomy have examined the roles of 
collective bargaining, skill, technology, work organisation and sector. Harley (2001) 
found, contrary to the expectations of high-performance management theorists, that 
team production techniques had little or no effect on personal discretion. Batt (2004) 
reports US evidence that self-managed teams enhance discretion somewhat for workers, 
but decreases it for supervisors. Gallie et al (2004) also report a mixed impact of 
teamworking, but they also found that neither technological/organisational nor 
compositional changes in Britain‟s labour market account for observed movements in 
task discretion. They speculate that the decline may have been linked to a growing 
culture of management by target-setting, and closer monitoring of work as a response to 
greater international competition or to an increasingly controlling regulatory 
framework. None of these studies have attempted to bring out a key role for 
commitment in determining job design.  
This paper proposes several advances in our understanding of task discretion. As a 
preliminary, the determination of discretion is first set in a simplified theoretical 
framework designed to bring out the role of affective commitment alongside skill. To 
set the empirical scene, it sheds some preliminary light on whether the 1990s decline in 
British workers‟ task discretion has continued in the present decade. I then make use of 
matched employer-employee data to investigate the multiple determinants of task 
discretion. The richness of the data permits an analysis of the impact of several forms 
of work organisation including teamworking, home working and other forms of flexible 
work practices, as well as an investigation of the effect of management by target-setting 
and a focus on the role of worker‟s commitment and skill. The paper also explores for 
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the first time the effect of skill mismatch on discretion, in particular the impact on 
discretion of workers being under-skilled for their job. Finally, it examines the extent to 
which unknown establishment-specific effects are having an effect on job design. The 
significance of this investigation is that any establishment-fixed effects on job design 
are interpretable as potentially originating from the particular management culture of 
the organisation. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out a simple model of the determination 
of task discretion which highlights the role of worker commitment, and derives a 
number of hypotheses for empirical testing. The model implies that discretion is 
increased when workers have greater commitment, but that the relationship with job-
skill level is ambiguous and the link with skills mis-match is asymmetric. Section 3 
describes the data, and Section 4 follows with the reported findings.  
 
2. The determination of discretion: theory and model specification. 
The level of autonomy afforded to workers in their jobs can be viewed as a decision 
about job design. The aim of this section is to describe a simplified model of the 
determination of task discretion (representing autonomy) for a job, which will provide 
the framework for the empirical investigation of hypotheses in Section 4. The essence 
of the model is in part a trade-off between effort and efficiency. This part of the theory 
is in the spirit of economic models in which the allocation of decision rights is 
endogenously determined by the trade-off between the value (to principals) derived 
from delegating authority and associated incentives to agents (in this case, employees) 
and the costs of ceding control to agents whose interests differ from those of principals 
(Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Dessein, 2002; Athey and Roberts, 2001). In this paper, 
however, I am not concerned with the resulting interactions between incentives 
structures and delegation. Quite simply, the decision about discretion is assumed to be 
affected both by the extent to which discretion raises (or lowers) productivity and by 
the impact of discretion on worker effort, which in turn depends on workers‟ 
commitment to the organisation.  
In practice potential discretion ranges over many domains in any one job. Employees 
might be able to decide the order of tasks, for example, without having any say over 
which tasks are to be done. Some tasks may be left to employees‟ decisions, while 
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others are closely controlled by managers. At any one time discretion can be conceived 
as the proportion of feasible tasks among which the employee can decide on a course of 
action. The average taken over a sufficient period constitutes the level of discretion in 
the job. I postpone till the next section how this concept of discretion can be 
operationalised and captured with survey items. 
We can express the value of output per employee,  q, as: 
( ; , ) ( ; )q f x s g x c          (1) 
where f() is the productivity of effective labour, and g() is the amount of effective 
labour per employee (work effort); x is the level of employee discretion,  = h – s is the 
difference between the own skill level (h) and the job-skill level (s), and c is the level of 
affective organisational commitment (to be discussed below). Discretion may raise 
productivity up to a point, but it may also diminish work effort – a standard principal-
agent issue. It is this form of the production function which generates the fundamental 
post-Fordist trade-off in job design. Whereas, in traditional neoclassical theory, it used 
to be assumed that the employer would choose to design jobs with zero discretion, 
modern theory recognises that there are productive advantages to granting employees 
freedom to make hard-to-anticipate daily decisions, or more broadly to exercise 
creative powers on behalf of the employer. Some local task discretion is productive 
because it makes better use of employee‟s knowledge and information that is frequently 
changing than is possible for distant managers. This assumption reflects the idea of 
post-Taylorism in labour process theory, and captures a substantial literature 
concerning functional flexibility in modern organisations. Up to a point the marginal 
productivity of increased discretion is assumed positive, though there will be 
diminishing returns as workers are constrained by the limits of their own knowledge 
and skill.  
More skilled jobs are more productive. Moreover, because decision-making and 
creativity require the employee to have knowledge of existing production processes and 
future possibilities, I expect high-skilled jobs, as long as they are matched by higher-
skilled workers, to benefit more than low-skilled jobs would from discretion.
2
 Complex 
production processes (giving more skilled jobs) are more likely to benefit from dense 
optimal decision-making than simpler processes that can be coded in informal, 
bureaucratic or software routines. The lowest amount of discretion is needed for low-
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skilled routine jobs, where decision-making is thin. Where, by contrast, there are many 
non-routine functions required, as can happen in some service jobs that are nevertheless 
classified as low-skilled, there remains a productive value to allowing such workers a 
measure of discretion. The post-Fordist thesis stated in this and the previous paragraph 
is embodied in the assumptions 0,0,0,0  xssxxx ffff .  
The match between the workers‟ skills and the jobs they do is also important. With 
frictions in the labour market, including hiring costs, workers can and often do persist 
in jobs where they have too many or too few skills needed to do the job well. For any 
given level of job skills a rise in own skills raises productivity when workers are under-
skilled but has little or no impact when workers are over-skilled. In addition the 
marginal productivity of discretion is expected to be lower the more that employees are 
under-skilled for the job, because the benefits of local decision-making are reduced if 
some wrong decisions are made. On the other hand, if employees are over-skilled for 
the job, one would not expect the marginal productivity of discretion to be affected by 
further increments to the employee‟s skill. Thus: 
   .00,000    forffforfandf xx  
Personal skill, however, is not the only factor constraining the level of afforded 
discretion. The latter depends, also, on the fact that increased discretion gives more 
scope for opportunistic behaviour, and so may lower work effort, other things equal. 
The constraint on opportunistic behaviour is the threat of some penalty for those caught 
taking advantage of this scope. I abstract from considering variations in monitoring 
costs or in wages, either of which can play the central role in determining discretion in 
standard models. Instead, despite its impact on effort non-zero discretion is chosen 
because of its direct positive impact on productivity.  Formally, I assume 0xg . 
However, the potential losses from opportunistic behaviour depend on workers‟ 
preferences – in this case, their disutility from effort on behalf of their employer. 
Whereas economic theory typically takes workers‟ preferences as given, here I draw on 
psychological literature for a measurable construct, i.e. “organisational commitment”. 
A substantial literature from psychology and from human resource management 
analysts shows that employees are to different degrees committed to their work 
organisation. A distinction is made between forms of commitment, the most prominent 
categorisation being between “affective”, “continuance” and “normative” commitment. 
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A good part of the research programme of psychologists working in this area has been 
trying to understand how the different states of mind and preferences represented by 
these constructs relate to each other, and to other psychological constructs. The 
constructs are also expected to be related to behaviours such as turnover and effort, and 
these have been confirmed in many studies (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990; Meyer et al, 
2002). Of most relevance here is the idea of affective commitment, associated with the 
work of Mowday et al (1979, 1982). From the economists‟ perspective, affective 
organisational commitment can be thought of as a proxy for the utility attached to 
working for the current employing organisation, compared to a similar job working for 
the next best available organisation. The worker experiences firm-specific utility from 
belonging to (being employed by) the organisation, in so far as he/she shares the values 
of, and identifies with, the organisation. Those with a greater affective commitment to 
their organisation want to work harder, or are less averse to work effort, on behalf of 
the organisation.
3
 Moreover, increased affective organisational commitment is expected 
to raise the marginal impact of discretion on work effort (that is, to lower the negative 
impact of discretion). Thus I assume 0,0  xcc gg . 
Assuming a firm designs jobs with discretion levels to maximise output per employee 
the first-order condition for an interior solution implies: 
0 xx fggf           (2) 
Thus the optimal work design is set where the marginal productivity of an increase in 
discretion (the first term in the equation) is set equal to the marginal loss from lower 
effort (the negative of the second term). This is the fundamental post-Taylorist trade-off 
in job design that I referred to above. It is a simple matter of comparative statics to 
show how employers would aim to set different levels of discretion according to 
varying levels of commitment, skill and skill match: 
 xcxc fgfg
c
x





 1
        (3) 
 xsxs gfgf
s
x





 1
        (4) 
 xx gfgf
x







 1
        (5) 
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where 02  xxxxxx gffggf   by the 2
nd
-order condition that output per employee 
is being maximised.  
Equation (3) shows that the level of discretion is unambiguously expected to increase in 
the level of commitment, because the theoretical assumptions ensure that both terms on 
the right hand side are positive. An employer whose workforce is more committed and 
loyal will choose to grant greater autonomy to them, allowing them greater discretion to 
choose which tasks to do, how and when to do them, how well to do each of them and 
how hard to work at them.  
Equation (4) indicates that the effect of job-skill level on discretion is, however, 
ambiguous. A rise in job-skill level increases the marginal impact of discretion on 
output (the first term in (4) is positive); while the (negative) second term shows that in 
a high-skilled job there is more value at stake from opportunistic behaviour. If the first 
term prevails, we expect to see discretion associated with high-skilled jobs, which is the 
conventional presumption in sociological accounts of discretion in its relation to social 
class. The second term shows the possibility that there may be some highly skilled jobs, 
however, which managers choose to monitor closely and allow little discretion. The 
cost to the employer of self-interested employee behaviour is raised if the job-skill is 
raised.
4,
 
5
.  
The effect on discretion of a rise in own skill level is predicted to be zero, when skill is 
above the matched level for the job, according to equation (5). When own skill is below 
the matched level, the impact of own skill is ambiguous. In that circumstance the first 
term in (5) is positive, reflecting the fact that more skill raises the marginal productivity 
of discretion, and hence the demand for discretion. The second term is negative, 
however, reflecting again the fact that the stakes are raised when skill is increased.  
Thus the discretion function can be written: 
( , , , )x x c s           (6) 
with 0cx  , xs ambiguous and x either zero if   is non-negative or ambiguous 
otherwise; M is included in order to represent the different production functions that 
prevail in each establishment. M can be seen as capturing either different technologies 
that require varying levels of local decision-making, or more generally establishment-
specific management policies. Some of the latter will be observable practices and 
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policies, while others may by unobserved cultures that entail certain beliefs about the 
productiveness of discretion. M thus allows for the possibility that there will be 
establishment-wide attitudes to job design that are not related to job or personal 
characteristics.  
Assuming a linear specification we may write the following equation to be estimated: 
ij ij ij ij i j j ijx c s X Z                  (6
/
) 
Subscripts ij refer to employee i in establishment j; iX  is a vector of controls for 
personal and job characteristics; jZ  are controls for observed establishment policies 
and practices; j  captures the unobserved establishment-fixed effects, and ij  random 
error. 
Equation (6
/
) is a structural equation determining the level of discretion, and it might be 
thought of as part of a wider model of determination within an organisation, that 
encompasses job design, other elements of work organisation, skill, wages and broader 
strategies and technology. In principle, the way to analyse firm behaviour should be 
through a multi-variable model that treats firm behaviour in a system context, in which 
all but a few variables are seen as endogenous outcomes of the managerial system. Yet 
no empirical studies of work organisation have been couched in such a systemic way, 
owing to the twin problems of scarce data and the difficulties of identifying structural 
relationships from observed behaviour.  The typical approach is to specify single-
equation relationships in linear or easy-to-estimate forms, and treat all RHS variables as 
exogenous; or else to limit the aim to capturing conditional correlations which may or 
may not be indicative of causation. Studies of discretion  are also like this (Harley, 
2001; Gallie et al, 2004). Arguably single-equation OLS studies do pick up much that is 
sensible about real-world relationships. Yet unobserved heterogeneity is a ubiquitous 
issue throughout quantitative industrial relations research. In this case, a potential 
problem arises in that a key RHS variable, commitment, is a measure of self-reported 
preferences, while the dependent variable is a self-reported measure of work design. If 
both self-reports are affected by unobserved personality traits, which could increase the 
likelihood of more positive responses to both commitment and discretion, the estimate 
of  will be upward biased. The risk of bias is compounded by the possibility that 
reverse causation is also present. Designing jobs with high levels of discretion may be 
one way of generating affective organisational commitment (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 
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1990), since worker autonomy is a major determinant of job satisfaction. A more 
satisfied worker is more likely to develop preferences favourable to the organisation, 
and indeed several studies report correlations between job satisfaction and 
organisational commitment (Cohen and Gattiker, 1994). It will therefore be necessary 
to account for potential biases in the estimates of  , through the use of suitable 
instruments to be discussed in the next section. 
The assumptions of the model imply the following hypotheses: 
^ ^ ^ ^
1: 0; 2 : ; 3: 0, 0H H ambiguous H ambiguous for otherwise        
These hypotheses can be tested using a variety of assumptions about the covariance of 
the error structures. In addition, I shall also consider in Section 5 whether certain 
management policies or technological/organisational characteristics captured in jZ  or 
job characteristics captured in iX , have the expected association with task discretion – 
these include teamworking, homeworking, Just-In-Time production systems, flexible 
work practices, forms of work monitoring, and trade union membership. 
 
3. Data. 
To investigate these issues I make use of a recent matched establishment-employee data 
set, the Workplace Employment Relations Survey, 2004 (WERS 2004), which is a 
nationally representative, multi-part, survey of people at work. WERS2004 represents a 
continuation of earlier surveys of British industrial relations, though only the 1998 and 
2004 surveys have contained surveys of matched employees. The survey series 
provides a mapping of employment relations practices across establishments and time. 
The management survey in WERS2004 gives measures of workplace characteristics, as 
well as rich details of human resource practices, and representation and communication 
mechanisms. In 2004, the sample was drawn from establishments with 5 or more 
workers. A stratified sampling strategy was pursued, in order to obtain sufficient cases 
of establishments with many employees. Accordingly analyses are normally weighted 
by the sampling weights provided (which also take account of non-response biases) in 
order to obtain unbiased estimates of the target population across Britain. The true 
response rate among eligible establishments was 64%. 
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For the survey of employees, questionnaires were distributed by management to up to 
25 potential respondents in each establishment. In the case of establishments with 
between 5 and 25 employees, all employees received a questionnaire; for larger 
establishments, employees were chosen using a random selection process. In about 14% 
of establishments where a manager was interviewed, no employee questionnaires were 
returned, largely because the forms failed to be distributed. Among those where at least 
one questionnaire was returned, the employee response rate was 61%. The non-
response, together with the survey-design selection probabilities, was used to generate 
appropriate weights for use in analyses. Details of the differential non-response rates 
can be found in the Technical Report along with the data at the UK Data Archive 
(Department of Trade and Industry. Employment Markets Analysis and Research et al., 
2005). In what follows, it is implicitly assumed that any unobserved factors affecting 
response propensities are not correlated with the variables of interest in the analyses. 
Use is also made of the equivalent employee survey in WERS98 to examine the most 
recent trends in discretion and commitment. In what follows, the analysis is confined to 
the private sector.
6
  
 
4. Findings. 
 
a) Measuring Task Discretion and Organisational Commitment. 
The measure of task discretion was derived from responses to five questions that began 
with the common stem: “In general, how much influence do you have over the 
following?”. The questions then referred to what tasks were done, the pace of work, 
how the work was done, the order in which tasks were done, and the timing of the start 
and finish of the working day. Against each of these domains of control, respondents 
replied on a 4-point scale. 
Their responses are shown in Table 1. It can be seen that a substantial majority of 
respondents perceived that they had at least some influence in four of the domains; but 
that only a half of respondents felt that they had at least “some” control of when they 
started and finished work. A third were completely constrained in the latter regard, 
experiencing no control at all. 
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For the subsequent analysis I computed a single measure capturing the overall level of 
task discretion in the job. Assigning cardinal values 1-4 respectively to the responses 
“none” to “a lot”, an additive scale is obtained, entitled the Task Discretion Index 
(TDI), by averaging the values of all five variables, yielding a range 1 to 4 and a mean 
of 3.002. Cronbach‟s alpha statistic measuring scale reliability for this measure is 
0.815, which implies a good level of reliability. Alternative indices can also be used, in 
order to test the robustness of the findings. One alternative is to generate scores from a 
factor analysis. The principal factor method was used, and this extracted only one 
factor. In another alternative, the fifth domain was excluded from the scale (for both the 
additive scale and the factor score), since its correlation with the other domains was the 
lowest. In what follows, a broadly similar pattern of findings emerges from using any 
of these alternatives, so only the findings from the additive scale are presented.  
Complementing employees‟ estimates of their own task discretion, managers‟ were also 
asked three questions about the individual task discretion involved in the jobs of 
employees. Managers were asked “to what extent would you say that individuals (in the 
largest non-managerial occupational group in the establishment) have discretion over 
how they do their work”. Subsequent questions asked about having “control over the 
pace at which they do their work” and “involvement in decisions over how their work is 
organised”. Respondents could answer “a lot”, “some”, “little” or “none”. The 
responses to these questions were averaged to generate a separate additive scale  
(Cronbach‟s alpha = 0.723), to be entitled the “Task Discretion Index, Managers‟ 
Perception” (TDIMP), again ranging from 1 to 4. Earlier studies have found that there 
tends not to be a high correlation between managers‟ and employees‟ perceptions of 
task discretion; nevertheless it is of interest to examine the extent to which the the TDI 
and the TDIMP scales are correlated in the WERS04 data. For this purpose, I computed 
the mean TDI at establishment level, for only those employees who belonged to the 
largest occupational group.
7
 The mean establishment-level estimate of the employees‟ 
perception of discretion is measured imprecisely, because of the limited numbers in 
each establishment who were issued with and responded to the self-completion 
questionnaire. In the event, the correlation coefficient between the mean establishment-
level TDI and the TDIMP was 0.210, significantly positive with a p-value of 0.00. 
Restricting the sample to those few establishments (86) with at most 25 employees and 
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where more than 50% of employees responded on this question, the correlation 
coefficient is somewhat higher, at 0.315.  
Table 2 shows the variation in task discretion across major occupational groups and 
across the education levels of the employee respondents. As the table shows, the TDI 
and TDIMP are both broadly related as one would expect with the major occupational 
groups: Managers and Professionals and Associate Professionals, typically seen as the 
high-skilled groups, report above-average levels of discretion. Nevertheless, aside 
from these groups there is less of a gradient of the TDI between traditional 
conceptions of occupational skill level and discretion. The table also brings out that 
there is a positive association between employee discretion and education levels. 
Nevertheless, this association is shown only to apply within the upper levels of the 
education spectrum. At level 3 (two or more A-levels) and below there is essentially 
no relationship between education and task discretion; but there is a clear upward 
gradient between levels 3 and 5 (Higher Degree). 
Table 1     Distribution of Domains of Task Discretion, 2004 
 
 Domains of Control 
 What tasks Pace at 
which work 
done 
How tasks 
done 
Order of 
tasks 
Time of 
start and 
finish of 
work day 
A lot 37.6 39.4 51.6 49.8 25.6 
Some 36.4 34.6 32.7 33.0 23.6 
A little 14.4 15.1 11.3 10.8 16.3 
None 11.6 10.8 4.4 6.3 34.5 
 
Task Discretion Index (see text):  
 Mean   3.002 
 Range   1-4 
 Standard Deviation 0.752 
 
Estimates weighted by probability of employee selection. 
A small number of cases with missing values is excluded. 
 
 
 
Table 2  Task Discretion Indices by Major Occupation Group  
 
 
Occupation
 
TDI TDIMP 
Managers 3.46 n.a. 
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Professionals 3.16 3.30 
Associate Professionals 3.13 3.14 
Administrative & Secretarial 2.99 2.98 
Skilled Trades 2.97 2.83 
Personal  Services 2.84 2.79 
Sales 2.74 2.70 
Plant & Machine Operatives 2.73 2.43 
Elementary 2.84 2.42 
Education Level 
(Equivalences)   
0. No qualifications 2.95 - 
1. GCSE grade D-G  2.92 - 
2. GCSE grade A-C  2.88 - 
3. Two or more A-Levels  2.97 - 
4. Batchelor‟s degree  3.11 - 
5. Higher degree 3.21 - 
Estimates weighted by probability of employee selection. 
A small number of cases with missing values is excluded. 
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 Particular cases at the 2-digit level also serve to make the point that the TDI is 
broadly in line with prior expectations. Marketing and sales managers, for example, 
have high levels of discretion (mean value 3.59) as do production, works and 
maintenance managers (3.46). By contrast, examples of occupations with low levels 
of discretion include call centre operators (2.31) and bus, van and coach drivers 
(2.57). One reason why Elementary Occupations do not all show especially low 
discretion levels, despite their low-skilled tag, is that this group embraces occupations 
that nevertheless require non-routine processes. Cleaners and domestics, for example, 
have slightly above-average discretion (3.05), despite being classed as low-skilled. 
Task discretion has been found in detailed case studies and in earlier empirical work 
to be related strongly to job satisfaction (e.g. Green and Tsitsianis, 2005). WERS04 
asks employees about seven separate domains of job satisfaction, each measured 
against a five-point scale ranging from “very satisfied” to “very dissatisfied”. Four of 
these domains pertain to intrinsic aspects of the job (sense of achievement, scope for 
initiative, amount of influence, the work itself) while the remaining three tap extrinsic 
aspects (pay, security and training). Assigning values 1 to 5 to the response points I 
generated a simple additive index of intrinsic job satisfaction (Cronbach‟s alpha = 
0.849 ). The individual-level correlation between this intrinsic job satisfaction index 
and the TDI was 0.371. Some validation of the discretion data is evident in this strong 
correlation.
8
 
To measure organisational commitment, WERS04 asks three items drawn from the 
Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (Mowday et al. 1982). The questions 
asked respondents how far they agreed with the statements: “I share many of the 
values of my organisation”, “I feel loyal to my organisation” and “I am proud to tell 
people who I work for”. The responses were against the scale: “strongly agree”, 
“agree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree”, “strongly disagree”. While the 
number of items is less than desirable, they form the core of the notion of affective 
commitment, essentially a measure of employee preferences concerning working for 
their employer.
9
 The responses from these three items were averaged to generate an 
additive scale of Organisational Commitment ranging from 1 to 5, with a Cronbach‟s 
scale reliability coefficient of 0.850.   
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b) The Change in Task Discretion and Organisational Commitment, 1998-2004. 
Did the decline in Task Discretion through the 1990s identified by Gallie et al (2004) 
persist in the present decade? Table 3 presents some initial suggestive evidence to 
emerge on this issue. It compares responses to identical questions on task direction in 
WERS98 and WERS04. Only two domains are available for this exercise: control 
over the pace of work and over how tasks are done. To ensure comparability of the 
sample base, those working in establishments with less than 10 employees were 
excluded from the WERS04 data. The comparison is reliable to the extent that the 
employee samples are representative of the population in each year; to help ensure 
this, the responses have been weighted.
10
  
As can be seen, there has been little change in the extent of discretion over the period. 
If anything, there appears to have been a small increase in the proportions of 
employees experiencing “a lot” of control over the pace of work, and over how the 
work is done. However, these differences are not statistically significant, and 
according to the managers‟ reports for the largest occupational group in the 
establishments there has been a small decrease in discretion.   This stability contrasts 
with the earlier decline in discretion.
11
  
In a similar way, Table 4 compares organisational commitment over the two surveys. 
According to Gallie et al (2001) there was little change during the 1990s in the extent 
of organisational commitment in the British workforce, a somewhat surprising finding 
in light of much rhetoric concerning the growth of the high-commitment work 
organisation. Looking over the more recent period, Table 4 shows that there were 
small increases in each component of organisational commitment; and the mean level 
of the Organisational Commitment index increased significantly between 1998 and 
2004. 
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Table 3  Task Discretion, 1998-2004. 
 
Employees’ reports Control over pace of 
work 
Discretion over how 
work is done 
 % of employees % of employees 
 1998 2004 1998 2004 
A lot 35.4 38.7 48.8 51.2 
Some 36.5 34.6 33.6 32.9 
A little 16.1 15.3 11.5 11.4 
None 13.5 11.4 6.1 4.6 
Managers’ reports for largest 
occupational group 
Control over pace of 
work 
Discretion over how 
work is done 
 % of establishments % of establishments 
 1998 2004 1998 2004 
A lot 25.7 23.0 28.8 23.7 
Some 38.9 41.2 41.6 41.0 
A little 25.1 26.1 20.7 26.0 
None 10.4 9.7 9.0 9.3 
The base is all private sector employees in establishments with at least 10 workers. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Table 4  Organisational Commitment, 1998 and 2004. 
 
 Shares values Feels loyalty Proud to tell 
 1998 2004 1998 2004 1998 2004 
Strongly 
agree 
7.5 10.8 16.2 20.1 16.7 20.0 
Agree 
 
41.6 41.7 49.0 49.6 39.8 39.7 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
34.8 34.5 23.7 19.9 31.5 29.1 
Disagree 
 
12.2 9.9 7.7 7.4 7.9 7.5 
Strongly 
disagree  
3.8 3.1 3.6 3.0 4.1 3.6 
The base is all private sector employees in establishments with at least 10 workers. 
OC Index in 1998: 
 Mean 3.539 
 S.E. 0.006 
OC Index in 2004: 
 Mean 3.630  
 S.E. 0.007 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
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c) Estimating the Model of Task Discretion. 
Tables 5 and 6 present estimates of the impact of organisational commitment and of 
other variables on task discretion, with Table 5 giving the results for the employee-
level measure of discretion (TDI) and Table 6 for the establishment-level measure 
(TDIMP). In order to be able to compare better the findings from the two levels of 
analysis, the analysis in Table 5 is based only on employees in the non-managerial 
occupation groups. 
Column (1) of Table 5 gives the OLS estimates, while column (2) presents estimates 
using instruments for organisational commitment, and column (3) presents fixed-
effects estimates which control for establishment-wide unobserved effects on job 
design.  
Variables used as instruments for organisational commitment in column (2) are as 
follows. First, two variables are included which capture management‟s report on 
whether employees in the establishment are “led to expect long-term employment in 
this organisation”. One dummy variable is included for “strongly agree”; another 
dummy represents “disagree” or “strongly disagree”. Second, two variables are 
included which capture whether, in the management‟s view, “employees here are 
fully committed to the values of the organisation”. Again, one dummy variable 
captures “strongly agree”, while another represents “disagree” or “strongly disagree”. 
By using variables taken from the management questionnaire, one can avoid potential 
common method bias, that is, the bias due to unobserved heterogeneity associated 
with personal traits affecting both dependent and independent variables, since 
presumably judgements made by manager respondents are not correlated with those 
made by individual employees. Using these variables as instruments depends on the 
assumption that they do not themselves affect job design for individual employees in 
the establishment except via the effect that they may have on the organisational 
commitment of individuals. Moreover, in order to provide well-defined instrumental 
variable estimates, the instruments should also have a strong association with 
organisational commitment. 
As usual in such cases these assumptions could be questioned. For example, even 
though the expectation of long-term employment is not obviously connected directly 
to autonomy in the workplace other than through commitment, it would not be hard to 
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manufacture a possible explanation. Accordingly, diagnostics tests are needed to 
examine whether the instrumental variable assumptions are satisfied in practice. The 
Hansen J statistic for overidentification is computed to be 2.486, which implies that 
one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error term in the equation estimating task discretion ( 3.112 3,01.0  ; P-value = 0.478). 
In that sense, they are correctly excluded from the specification.  
To test for whether the task discretion is under-identified, the Anderson canonical 
correlation LR statistic is computed to be 209.21, which implies that the null 
hypothesis that the equation is not identified (the instruments not correlated with 
commitment) can be rejected ( 3.132 4,01.0  ; P-value=0.000). There is sufficient 
correlation between the instruments and employee organisational commitment. 
However, it could still be the case that instruments are “weak”, which would mean 
that the estimates are biased (usually downwards) in finite samples and that the 
significance level is higher than implied by the reported t-statistics (Murray, 2006). 
The test for weak instruments is the first-stage F statistic, which is computed to be 
52.54; this implies that the true significance level is below 10% when the nominal 
level is 5% (critical value 19.93). Thus the instruments are not weak. 
Consider now the findings from Table 5. Do they support the hypotheses proposed in 
Section 2?  
An initial striking finding is that task discretion, as predicted (H1), is positively and 
strongly affected by workers‟ organisational commitment. This conclusion emerges 
first in the OLS estimate shown in column (1), but it is supported by the IV estimate 
shown in column (2), the latter showing only a slightly lower coefficient, not 
significantly different. I conclude that jobs for workers with greater commitment are 
indeed afforded greater discretion. Moreover, the direct impact is substantial: using 
the IV estimate, a one standard deviation increase in commitment raises task 
discretion by 0.182, which is 24% of the standard deviation of task discretion.  
Put another way, if we compare the job designs of workers who on average “neither 
agree nor disagree” with the three organisational commitment items with otherwise 
similar workers who “strongly agree” with the items, the effect on discretion of the 
raised commitment would be 0.44, more than the equivalent of switching from a 
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customer service occupation to a science and technology professional occupation 
which would normally be considered to be much more skilled.  
The link between task discretion and skill (H2) is investigated first by including 24 2-
digit occupational dummies, on the presumption that higher level occupations require 
greater skills. The least discretion is generally afforded to some of the lowest-ranking 
occupations (e.g. customer services, comprising call centre operators and other 
customer care occupations). Yet there are exceptions, with, for example, health 
professionals also showing low task discretion. Closer inspection reveals that this 
low-discretion finding for health professionals is mainly driven by 
pharmacists/pharmacologists in large workplaces. In all lines of work those in 
supervisory positions have, as expected and noted above, substantively greater levels 
of discretion. Another way of investigating H2 is through the link with computer 
usage. Jobs with a greater range of computer usages can be seen as loosely linked 
with skill and, as can be seen, the estimated impact of this variable is positive and 
significant.  
Thus the link with skill is weak though broadly positive, in line with prior information 
about labour processes in specific occupations, and in line with the normal 
expectation in sociological literature. Nevertheless, there are groups of workers with 
relatively low discretion despite their high skill levels. The mixed picture is consistent 
with the ambiguous story implied by (4). For such high-skill/low discretion 
occupations the explanation is that any extra productivity that might be obtained from 
giving them more discretion than less-skilled workers is more than outweighed by the 
loss of output from potentially lower effort levels that might accompany greater 
discretion.  
H3 concerns the link between the person-job skills match and discretion. Respondents 
were asked “How well do the work skills you personally have match the skills you 
need to do your present job?”, and could answer on a five point scale (Much higher/ a 
bit higher/ about the same/ a bit lower/ much lower). Table 5 shows that, for a given 
job skill level, workers who perceive that their skills match the required job skills are 
afforded more discretion than those who were under-skilled for the job. For this group 
of under-skilled (only about 5 % of the sample), employers have granted them less 
leeway because discretion for them would be less productive or even of negative 
value if it raised the frequency of inefficient actions. By contrast, those who thought 
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that they had more skills than needed (55% of the sample) were afforded neither more 
nor less than the discretion allowed for those whose skills were matched. 
Consider now the additional variables included because they carry information about 
the technology or work organisation that may independently affect the discretion that 
workers experience (thus affecting the production function). First I included an 
indicator of the use of a Just-In-Time inventory control system on the grounds that 
this system requires less individual freedom to alter the pace and timing work. Some 
34% of private sector employees work in establishments deploying a JIT system in 
Britain (see Appendix, Table A1). While the estimated effect on their discretion has a 
negative coefficient, it is not statistically different from zero in either the OLS or IV 
specifications. Thus, the one included establishment-level technical characteristic of 
production has a negligible association with discretion.  
Aspects of work organisation, however, are important. Home working, in particular, is 
expected to be associated with greater discretion, since for home workers managerial 
supervision of the labour process is restricted to problematic technologies of distance 
surveillance, uneasy home visits and the setting of behaviour-distorting targets 
(Felstead et al., 2003). The survey does not record whether individual workers are 
home workers, but it does report the proportion of employees who are working largely 
from home during working hours. Consistent with this expectation, workers in 
establishments with a larger proportion of home workers experience on average 
greater task discretion.  
The effect of teamworking, as a distinct form of work organisation, on task discretion 
has been investigated by Harley (2001) using data from WERS98. As Harley 
describes, two distinct hypotheses have been posed regarding the role of teamworking 
in shaping the design of individual jobs. Optimistic perspectives associated with HRM 
(Harley cites, among others, Katzenbach and Smith (1993)) have expected teams to 
raise employee discretion. By contrast critical accounts, for example that by 
Marchington (2000), have held that teamworking‟s putative liberating effect on job 
design was illusory and that teams instead led to new forms of control, to work 
intensification and to limited, rather than enhanced, discretion. Harley‟s paper 
constitutes an advance in our understanding of the effect of teams on employees. 
Using the nationally representative data available in WERS98 he finds that on average 
teams neither raise nor lower discretion significantly. Harley argues that the 
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introduction of teams has had little or no effect because teams are managerially 
driven, and/or teams do not constitute a major change in hierarchical work 
organisation. His analysis, however, is confined to establishments where either none 
or all of the establishment‟s largest occupation group (LOG) are in a team, and with 
further restrictions this means that only a minority of employees in WERS98 are 
included in the analysis. Moreover, Harley includes only one category of team in his 
analysis. Here I include both teams that appoint their own leaders and those that do 
not; and both teams which, according to managers, “jointly decide how work is done” 
and those that do not. These two variables are each interacted with an index of the 
proportion of the largest group that is working in teams. 
It can be seen from Table 5 that the impact of team working on discretion is 
significant but differentiated. Consider, first, teams where members do not jointly 
decide how work is done. Comparing establishments with no teamworking in the 
largest occupational group with establishments where there is 100% teamworking, 
discretion is 0.65 lower, consistent with the critical accounts of teamwork. However, 
for those teams where team members jointly decide about work (covering 
establishments with 49% of employees), the negative impact of teams is almost 
exactly neutralised: the joint impact is -0.002 and statistically insignificant. For these 
employees the essence of Harley‟s neutral finding is reproduced here. Finally, 
whether the team is self-led or otherwise appears to have no significant effect on 
whether the team enhances or diminishes employee discretion. These findings imply 
that, while the critical accounts of teamwork‟s effect on employees find support for 
about half of employees, there is a need to distinguish between team types in order to 
capture heterogeneity in their effects on work organisation. 
Also expected to have a positive association with individual discretion is where the 
firm introduces various flexible hours policies. One can sometimes distinguish 
between whether the policy is there to serve the flexibility needs of the employee (e.g. 
“flexitime”) and whether its function is mainly to provide flexibility for the employer 
(e.g. zero hours working). I expected the former to be associated with higher 
perceived discretion. The data, which is derived from the management questionnaire, 
allow us to identify whether each flexible working time arrangement is applied to 
some workers in the establishment, and not whether any given employee can access 
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that arrangement. Nevertheless, it might be presumed that in many establishments the 
policies are generalised to all or most workers.  
The pattern of coefficient estimates implies that task discretion for employees is 
raised where there is a “flexitime” policy in place (no set starting and finishing times, 
though set overall hours). This finding is as expected, and serves if nothing else to 
confirm the reliability of workers‟ perceptions of discretion. Conversely, discretion is 
lowered in establishments where there are flexible shifts; and the coefficient estimates 
for a zero hours policy and for annualised work hours are negative though 
insignificant. These types of flexibility policies help employers to call on workers to 
work when employers want them to.  
Where managers report having direct systems of quality monitoring might also be 
expected to have a negative bearing on workers‟ task discretion. Managers were asked 
how they monitored the performance of employees, and allowed to state as many 
methods as they used, including direct supervisor/manager monitoring, monitoring by 
a separate inspectors, self-monitoring, records of faults and complaints, customer 
surveys, and other unspecified methods. Most establishments (82%) use managers and 
supervisors to directly monitor quality, and this form of monitoring carries a negative 
coefficient. However, with a p-value of 0.16 the coefficient is not quite significant at 
conventional levels. The impacts on discretion of other forms of monitoring were 
negligible.  
A further set of establishment characteristics concerns the use of targets. It was 
hypothesised by Gallie et al. (2004) that the growing use of targets to control 
production may have been one of the causes of the observed reductions in employee 
discretion during the 1990s. The idea is that where targets are in force line managers 
might need to control work more closely to achieve them, but it is also possible that 
some targets could be imposed for employees precisely in situations where 
monitoring is costly. Responding managers were asked to state whether they had to 
meet any targets over a range of input and performance variables (profits, labour 
costs, sales, absenteeism and so on). A dummy variable was constructed to indicate 
whether or not any targets were used in the establishment. Only 12% of employees 
worked in establishments with no targets. While the point estimate on the dummy 
variable for “No Targets” is positive it is not statistically significant. This finding 
suggests that a rising use of targets is unlikely to have been a major explanation for 
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declining discretion during the 1990s, though it is conceivable the explanation would 
be more relevant in the public sector. 
Person-level and establishment-level controls were also added, to account for 
otherwise unspecified factors. that might influence job design. It is found that 
discretion is greater for older workers, and for non-whites. Discretion is set 
significantly lower for trade union members, a finding which has a straightforward 
interpretation. If employers fear that trade union members are more likely to behave 
in their own interests or those of the union, rather than the employer, they are likely to 
design jobs that afford workers less control over their actions. Alternatively, it could 
be that workers in low discretion jobs are more easily organised. 
While the estimates given in columns (1) and (2) have included standard errors 
adjusted for clustering within establishments, they do not allow for the possible 
unobserved effects of establishment characteristics on individual job design, some of 
which might be correlated with individual characteristics and hence generating biased 
estimates. By definition these establishment-specific characteristics are unobserved, 
but I take them to include both the effects of management culture and the particular 
production function of the establishment, both of which might be correlated with 
variables that are observed. The estimation shown in column (3) seeks to address this 
possibility. It shows the establishment fixed-effects estimates. As can be seen, there is 
little change from the magnitude of the coefficients given in columns (1) and (2), 
which implies that any unobserved fixed effects are largely orthogonal to the 
individual observed effects. Nevertheless, it is also the case that the R
2
 value is raised 
quite substantially from 0.18 to 0.32, suggesting that a notable amount of the variance 
of discretion can be accounted for by between-establishment variance. The test of the 
null hypothesis that the additions of establishment fixed effects does not account for 
additional variance is rejected at the level p=0.000, with F-statistic 1.882, critical 
value 1.000.  
 
d) Robustness Checks. 
Some alternative specifications have been used in order to test the robustness of the 
findings.  
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One alternative was to utilise as independent variable the establishment-level index of 
task discretion derived from the reports of managers, TDIMP. It may be recalled that 
this variable applies to the discretion afforded, in the manager‟s view, to the largest 
occupational group in the establishment, which may not be the same as for other 
employees. Moreover, the variable to be explained here is the average discretion of 
employees in that group, rather than directly with the individual-level discretion in 
jobs. For these reasons, the analysis of TDI at the individual level has been preferred 
to the analysis of TDIMP at the establishment level. Nevertheless, it will be re-
assuring for the main findings if the same or similar relationships are shown at the 
establishment level, and with data from a different informant.  
Table 6 presents the estimates of TDIMP across 1554 establishments. I utilise the 
index of full employee commitment as perceived by the manager which ranges from 1 
(“strong disagreement”) to 5 (“strong agreement”).12 As with the employee-level 
analysis, the managers‟ estimate of commitment may be endogenous, and for this 
analysis it is instrumented by the two variables capturing whether employees are led 
to expect long-term employment in the organisation. The Hansen J statistic for 
overidentification was 0.092 (p=0.762), suggesting that it is acceptable to reject the 
hypothesis that these instruments are correlated with the error term. The Anderson 
canonical correlation statistic is 105.56 (p=0.00), which implies that the excluded 
instruments are correlated with organisational commitment; in other words, the 
equation is identified. Finally, the Cragg-Donald F-statistic was 53.6 which implies 
that the instruments are not weak.  
Table 6 shows that discretion is enhanced in establishments with home working 
arrangements, and rises with the proportion of employees working at home. The index 
of team use is negatively associated with employee discretion (consistent with Table 
5) but in establishments where teams are explicitly said to allow for teams to jointly 
decide how work is to be done the teams are positively associated with individual 
discretion as perceived by managers: the coefficient for this group is calculated as 
0.426-0.106 = 0.320, which is also found to be statistically different from zero 
(p=0.007). In contrast to Table 5, then, this finding implies that there are some 
establishments (roughly half) where teams positively enhance discretion, in line with 
the story told by the more optimistic perspective on teamworking. The difference 
between this finding and the neutral finding using the individual-level data may be 
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due either to the differing level of analysis or to the differing informants about 
discretion.
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Another distinctive finding from this establishment-level analysis is evidence that 
employees in establishments with no targets are here estimated to have substantially 
greater discretion than those in establishments where one or more targets are set. The 
difference is estimated as 0.172 in the IV estimates, which amounts to just under a 
quarter of one standard deviation in TDIMP. This finding contrasts with that for the 
individual-level analysis which found only a small and insignificant effect. While one 
cannot be confident about the reasons for this difference in findings, one possibility is 
that managers in establishments that set targets feel at the same time that they are 
limiting employees‟ discretion, even if the employees do not experience it as any 
more restrictive than a no-target regime, (and indeed the employees need not be aware 
of the targets). 
Turning again to the central hypothesis of this paper, this establishment-level analysis 
confirms that there is a strong association of organisational commitment with 
employee discretion. The IV estimate implies that moving from a state where 
employee commitment is neither agreed nor disagreed with (16% of establishments), 
to a state where the manager strongly agrees that the employees are fully committed 
(19% of establishments), is associated with a rise in TDIMP by 0.520, which is 72% 
of the latter‟s standard deviation across establishments, and more than the average 
difference in discretion associated with moving from an elementary occupation to a 
professional occupation. The link with skill is also confirmed to be broadly positive, 
as implied in the occupational rankings (though with this establishment-level analysis 
there are no finer disaggregations of occupation than the 1-digit level).  
Two further robustness checks were carried out. First, as an alternative to occupation 
as a measure of skill, in the individual-level analysis I entered the employees‟ 
achieved qualification level. This analysis showed that, after conditioning on all the 
other variables included hitherto in the analysis, the level of discretion increases 
between qualification levels 4 and 5 (as with the raw data shown in Table 2); 
however, discretion is also higher at levels 0 and 1 than it is at levels 2, 3 and 4. This 
finding re-affirms what the earlier analysis has shown, that the relationship between 
discretion and skill (here loosely measured by the job-holder‟s education level) is not 
necessarily unambiguously positive as is often assumed. However, the analysis also 
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showed that the pattern of other findings was not substantially altered by the inclusion 
of education rather than occupation in the analysis. 
Second, in a further estimation the analysis was restricted to the employees who 
belonged to the largest occupational group (LOG) in the establishment. This sample 
restriction has the advantage that variables that were intended to apply to the LOG 
would be in principle more accurately measured; the disadvantage is that the sample 
size falls by more than half to 5,559. However, it is re-assuring to confirm that the 
pattern of findings remains largely unchanged from those obtained with the full 
sample of 11,845 employees. The central finding of a substantial impact of 
commitment on discretion is again found, with a coefficient of 0.243 (0.014), which is 
not much different from the coefficient estimates shown in Table 5. The other 
conditioning variables follow the same pattern, but with one exception. For this 
restricted sample, consistent with expectations the presence of a Just-In-Time 
production system is negatively associated with discretion, and unlike for the full 
sample this coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level. The estimated 
coefficient is -0.059 (0.031).
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5. Conclusion. 
This paper proposes the importance for labour economics to achieve a greater 
understanding of autonomy in the workplace, and has developed an analysis of the 
factors underlying task discretion. I argue that the key axis for understanding 
discretion is the fundamental post-Fordist trade-off between the positive effects of 
discretion on potential output per employee and the negative effects of greater leeway 
on work effort. This contrasts with the more commonly posed trade-off (in efficiency-
wage theory) for employers, between the benefits of greater work effort from close 
control and the increasing monitoring costs. The post-Fordist trade-off leads to the 
hypothesis that the design of discretion into jobs is highly dependent on workers‟ 
preferences for supplying effort to the employer.    
Using data from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 2004, the paper finds 
that, as expected, task discretion is strongly associated with affective organisational 
commitment. The loyal workers are the ones with greater autonomy at work.  
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The paper also confirms that task discretion is associated with job skill. It finds that 
discretion is lower, as expected, in the less skilled jobs. Managerial and professional 
jobs have above-average discretion. However, there are some notable exceptions. 
There are quite high-skilled jobs that do not have high levels of discretion, and some 
low-skilled jobs where there appears to be some considerable autonomy. The formal 
model has suggested an explanation for this ambiguity, namely that in some high-
skilled jobs the costs of lower effort may be high, and if in these jobs the benefits of 
discretion are perceived to be limited employers may opt to design jobs with little 
discretion. This is not, of course, the only possible explanation for exceptions to the 
traditional association between discretion and skill. An alternative explanation is that 
some traditionally-termed low-skilled jobs, which may require few or no 
qualifications, may nevertheless entail largely non-routine activities: in such cases it 
can be difficult for employers to closely specify work tasks. The paper has also shown 
that it is important for the skills of the employee and the job to be well-matched. 
Under-skilled workers, especially, need more supervision and report lower levels of 
discretion. 
Certain forms of work organisation have been shown to be associated significantly 
with discretion. Most notably, and unsurprisingly, homeworking is found to permit 
high levels of autonomy. Of especial interest is the impact of teamworking. It is 
shown that, contrary to the earlier work of Harley (2001), teamworking has a 
differentiated effect on task discretion. For just under half (47%) of the employees 
who work in establishments where teams are prevalent, managers indicate that the 
teams are not permitted to jointly decide how work is done. In those cases teams are 
associated with a reduction in individual task discretion, consistent with the negative 
perspective on teams advanced by some recent critical accounts. In the remaining 
establishments, where managers see teams as having some leeway, employees have 
neither high nor low levels of self-perceived discretion; however, in the managers‟ 
own perceptions, employees have higher levels of individual discretion than where 
there are either teams that do not have joint decision-making powers or where there 
are no teams at all.   
Companies‟ policies on flexible working also have an impact on workers‟ task 
discretion, but the direction of the impact depends on the form of flexibility, thus 
demonstrating the need for care when discussing flexibility as a strategy. Where 
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flexibility is introduced as something to benefit employees (as with home-working or 
flexitime schemes) it has, as expected, a positive effect on discretion. Where the 
policies are to suit the employers‟ needs (e.g. annualised hours contracts) this tends to 
reduce discretion.  
Other findings suggest that it is unlikely that the increased use of target-setting could 
account for the decline of discretion observed in the 1990s. Although the absence of 
targets is significantly associated (in the establishment level analysis) with greater 
task discretion for workers, the magnitude of the coefficient is fairly small. A further 
finding is that, at least in two domains, task discretion has remained fairly stable in 
British workplaces between 1998 and 2004. This finding of stability is consistent with 
recent findings from alternative individual-level survey data that task discretion 
remained unchanged between 2001 and 2006 (Felstead et al., 2007).  
It will be important in future work to further our understanding of autonomy in the 
workplace, if only because of its large impact on employee well-being especially in 
effort-intensive jobs. Moreover, following on from the finding of a large and 
significant role for commitment in affecting the design of autonomy into jobs three 
further lines of enquiry suggest themselves. First, if worker autonomy is assumed to 
be so efficient in a flexible-specialisation productive environment, one can see more 
clearly the rationale behind high-commitment strategies being deployed in many 
modern workplaces. The question which remains is to what extent such high-
commitment policies are successful in generating commitment, and in what 
circumstances (Wood and Albanese, 1995). Along parallel lines, Akerlof and Kranton 
(2005) summarise findings on organisational behaviour from sociology in order to 
criticise the exclusive focus of economics on monetary incentives; they advocate a 
research programme for economists to elaborate the implications of identity-creating 
investments by firms (for example, Green, 2000). Such a programme needs to 
recognise, however, that investing in changing people‟s preferences is not without 
limitations and contradictions, as is recognised in both sociological and management 
literatures (e.g. Argyris, 1998) and may involve unresolved normative dilemmas. 
Second, the analysis here suggests that the relationship between organisational 
commitment and worker well-being is mediated strongly by autonomy, and without 
this link it may be questioned whether commitment should be seen as a positive 
element in worker well-being. Third, following on from that, it is possible that the 
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combination of autonomy and commitment is, from the perspective of workers, a 
mixed blessing. Commitment, and its close relative workplace trust, can be misplaced 
if employers are not seen to reciprocate the exchange that comes from workers 
identifying with their employers‟ beliefs. Moreover, both discretion and commitment 
are predicted by competitive theory to have an impact on pay, since they can be 
regarded as capturing important compensating differentials. The consequences for 
pay, therefore, of high levels of commitment and autonomy deserve further empirical 
investigation. 
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Table 5   Determinants of Employee Task Discretion 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS IV Estab. FE 
Organisational commitment 0.226 0.219 0.224 
 (0.010)** (0.082)** (0.009)** 
OCCUPATION, Ref: Sci&Tech Profs     
Health Professionals -0.419 -0.422 -0.439 
 (0.251)+ (0.249)+ (0.146)** 
Teaching & Research Professionals 0.043 0.045 0.011 
 (0.069) (0.073) (0.073) 
Business & Public Service Profs -0.041 -0.039 0.073 
 (0.051) (0.055) (0.056) 
Sci & Tech Associate Professionals -0.143 -0.143 -0.138 
 (0.058)* (0.058)* (0.053)** 
Health & Soc. Welfare Ass. Profs 0.040 0.042 -0.053 
 (0.057) (0.061) (0.063) 
Protective Service Occupations -0.088 -0.086 -0.195 
 (0.286) (0.288) (0.284) 
Culture/Media/Sports Occupations 0.003 0.004 0.041 
 (0.054) (0.057) (0.072) 
Business/Public Service Ass. Profs 0.067 0.068 0.115 
 (0.040)+ (0.043) (0.042)** 
Administrative Occupations -0.082 -0.082 -0.045 
 (0.038)* (0.039)* (0.040) 
Secretarial and Related  -0.175 -0.173 -0.129 
 (0.053)** (0.058)** (0.051)* 
Skilled Agricultural Trades -0.049 -0.048 -0.202 
 (0.099) (0.101) (0.143) 
Skilled Metal & Electrical Trades -0.040 -0.040 -0.031 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) 
Skilled Construction & Building 0.051 0.052 -0.023 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.073) 
Textiles/Printing/Other Skilled 0.071 0.070 -0.009 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.062) 
Caring Personal Service  -0.192 -0.190 -0.302 
 (0.059)** (0.065)** (0.065)** 
Leisure/Other Personal Service -0.213 -0.210 -0.020 
 (0.073)** (0.080)** (0.072) 
Sales -0.143 -0.142 -0.126 
 (0.044)** (0.045)** (0.049)* 
Customer Service -0.360 -0.361 -0.252 
 (0.068)** (0.068)** (0.055)** 
Process, Plant & Machine Operatives -0.166 -0.167 -0.136 
 (0.046)** (0.046)** (0.046)** 
Transport Operatives -0.150 -0.149 -0.127 
 (0.056)** (0.056)** (0.055)* 
Elementary Trade/Plant/Storage -0.071 -0.071 -0.052 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.050) 
Elementary Administrative/Service -0.037 -0.036 -0.107 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.049)* 
    
Supervisor 0.254 0.256 0.254 
 (0.017)** (0.022)** (0.016)** 
Underskilled -0.172 -0.174 -0.162 
 (0.041)** (0.049)** (0.031)** 
Overskilled -0.015 -0.016 -0.019 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.014) 
Technology and work organisation variables:    
Number of uses of computer in job 0.029 0.029 0.033 
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.003)** 
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'Just-In-Time' Production -0.017 -0.017  
 (0.021) (0.021)  
Proportion working at home 0.175 0.178  
 (0.103)+ (0.108)+  
Index of team use in largest  -0.066 -0.065  
         occupational group (0.028)* (0.028)*  
Index of self-led team in largest  0.025 0.025  
         occupational group (0.052) (0.052)  
Index of team discretion in  0.062 0.063  
         largest occupational group (0.023)** (0.023)**  
    
Flexible Working Time Arrangements    
Flexitime 0.079 0.079  
 (0.020)** (0.020)**  
Flexible shifts -0.033 -0.033  
 (0.019)+ (0.019)+  
Compressed-hours working -0.001 -0.001  
 (0.026) (0.026)  
Annualised hours job -0.043 -0.043  
 (0.029) (0.029)  
Zero hours work -0.039 -0.040  
 (0.040) (0.040)  
    
Quality Monitoring Arrangements    
Monitoring by Manager/Supervisor -0.041 -0.042  
 (0.026) (0.027)  
Monitoring by Inspector(s) -0.002 -0.002  
 (0.020) (0.020)  
Monitoring by Records of Faults -0.018 -0.018  
 (0.021) (0.021)  
Monitoring by Customer Surveys -0.008 -0.007  
 (0.020) (0.021)  
    
No Targets 0.023 0.023  
 (0.029) (0.029)  
25 or more employees -0.000 -0.001  
 (0.023) (0.025)  
Trade Union Member -0.090 -0.091 -0.047 
 (0.022)** (0.024)** (0.021)* 
Age 0.018 0.018 0.015 
 (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.004)** 
Age Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Male -0.018 -0.019 -0.029 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.017)+ 
White -0.080 -0.081 -0.075 
 (0.038)* (0.040)* (0.030)* 
Constant 1.818 1.847 1.808 
 (0.115)** (0.342)** (0.090)** 
Observations 11845 11845 11845 
Mean (sd) of dependent variable 2.928 
(0.752) 
2.928 
(0.752) 
2.928 
(0.752) 
R
2
 0.18  0.32 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. For columns (1) and (2) standard errors are also robust to clustering within 
establishment. Weighted estimates. The sample is all non-managerial employees in the private 
sector. Column 3 controls for 1200 establishment fixed effects. 
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Table 6   Determinants of Managers’ Estimates of Employee Task Discretion 
 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS IV 
Employee Commitment (Managers‟ perception) 0.117 0.260 
 (0.037)** (0.124)* 
OCCUPATION, Ref: Professional Occupations   
Associate Professionals 0.088 0.094 
 (0.102) (0.103) 
Administrative & Secretarial -0.031 -0.022 
 (0.110) (0.109) 
Skilled Trades 0.029 0.054 
 (0.111) (0.109) 
Personal Service -0.142 -0.150 
 (0.126) (0.124) 
Sales -0.173 -0.141 
 (0.111) (0.111) 
Plant & Machine Operatives -0.285 -0.243 
 (0.108)** (0.112)* 
Elementary -0.488 -0.465 
 (0.112)** (0.110)** 
   
Technology and work organisation variables:   
'Just-In-Time' Production 0.026 0.040 
 (0.063) (0.065) 
Arrangement to work from home in normal hours  0.246 0.231 
 (0.066)** (0.067)** 
Proportion working at home (almost) always 0.599 0.484 
 (0.292)* (0.319) 
Index of team use in largest  -0.227 -0.225 
occupational group 
 
(0.082)** (0.084)** 
Index of self-led team in largest  0.116 0.106 
 occupational group (0.137) (0.133) 
Index of team discretion in  0.450 0.426 
 largest occupational group (0.081)** (0.084)** 
   
Flexible Working Time Arrangements   
Flexitime 0.038 0.031 
 (0.055) (0.056) 
Flexible shifts -0.118 -0.091 
 (0.063)+ (0.067) 
Compressed-hours working 0.040 0.021 
 (0.081) (0.082) 
Annualised hours job -0.041 -0.082 
 (0.092) (0.101) 
Zero hours work -0.001 0.018 
 (0.090) (0.096) 
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Quality Monitoring Arrangements   
Monitoring by Manager/Supervisor -0.075 -0.081 
 (0.072) (0.071) 
Monitoring by Inspector(s) -0.019 -0.014 
 (0.064) (0.064) 
Monitoring by Records of Faults -0.105 -0.091 
 (0.064) (0.068) 
Monitoring by Customer Surveys 0.028 0.023 
 (0.065) (0.066) 
   
No targets 0.156 0.172 
 (0.073)* (0.074)* 
25 or more employees -0.096 -0.077 
 (0.050)+ (0.056) 
Percent union members in establishment -0.00124 -0.00102 
 (0.00113) (0.00119) 
Constant 2.630 2.042 
 (0.193)** (0.520)** 
   
Observations 1554 1554 
Mean (sd) of dependent variable 2.894 (0.720) 2.894 
(0.720) 
R
2
 0.25  
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. The dependent variable is the index of managers‟ estimate of individual employee task 
discretion in largest occupational group. Weighted estimates. 
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Appendix. 
Independent Variables: Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Variable Notes Weighted 
Mean 
(11,845 
employees) 
Weighted 
Mean 
(1554 
establ-
ishments) 
Organisational 
Commitment 3-item average additive index – see text 
3.607 3.897 
2-Digit SOC    
22 
 
Health Professionals 0.002  
23 Teaching & Research Professionals 0.017  
24 Business & Public Service Profs 0.032  
31 Sci & Tech Associate Professionals 0.023  
32 Health & Soc. Welfare Ass. Profs 0.025  
33 Protective Service Occupations 0.001  
34 Culture/Media/Sports Occupations 0.017  
35 Business/Public Service Ass. Profs 0.085  
41 Administrative Occupations 0.157 
 
 
42 Secretarial and Related 0.046 
 
 
51 Skilled Agricultural Trades 0.004 
 
 
52 Skilled Metal & Electrical Trades 0.055  
53 Skilled Construction & Building 0.019  
54 Textiles/Printing/Other Skilled 0.022  
61 Caring Personal Service 0.038 
 
 
62 Leisure/Other Personal Service 0.018  
71 Sales 0.102 
 
 
72 Customer Service 0.039 
 
 
81 Process, Plant & Machine Operatives 0.069  
82 Transport Operatives 0.049 
 
 
91 Elementary Trade/Plant/Storage 0.047  
92 Elementary Administrative/Service 0.090  
Supervisor  0.270 
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Under-Skilled Skills “a bit lower” or “much lower” 
than needed to do job 
0.049  
Over-skilled Skills “a bit higher” or “much higher” 
than needed to do job 
0.547  
Number of uses of 
computer in job 
Up to twelve computer uses 2.937  
'Just-In-Time' Production  0.342 0.240 
Arrangement to work from 
home in normal hours 
For some employees in establishment  0.222 
Proportion working at 
home 
 0.019 0.019 
Index of team use in 
LOG*. 
Proportion of LOG working in teams  0.662 0.481 
Self-led team use in 
LOG*. 
Proportion in teams interacted with 
“team members are able to appoint their 
own team leaders 
0.030 0.038 
Index of team discretion in 
LOG*. 
Proportion in teams interacted with 
dummy for “team members jointly 
decide how work is done” 
0.322 0.296 
Flexitime No set start or finish time but total hours 
set  
0.391 0.333 
Flexible shifts Ability to shift patterns 0.556 
 
0.396 
Compressed-hours 
working 
e.g. 9-day fortnights 0.211 0.096 
Annualised hours job Any annualised hours arrangements in 
workplace 
0.112 0.026 
Zero hours work Any zero hours arrangements in 
workplace  
0.086 0.038 
Monitoring by 
Manager/Supervisor 
How work quality is monitored. 0.866 0.818 
Monitoring by 
Inspector(s) 
“  “ 0.397 0.229 
Monitoring by Records of 
Faults 
“  “ 0.634 0.424 
Monitoring by Customer 
Surveys 
“  “ 0.563 0.364 
No Targets None of 11 possible targets 0.120 0.246 
 
25 or more employees Size of workplace 0.721 0.207 
Trade Union Member  0.218 
 
 
Establishment Union 
Density (%) 
  8.306 
Age  38.8 
 
 
Age Squared  1671.4 
 
 
Male  0.498 
 
 
White 
 
0.937 
 
 
*Largest occupational group in establishment.  
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1
 This dilemma (and associated class conflict) did not, of course, originate in the current era 
(Braverman, 1974). However, a central tenet of the post-Fordist theory of production is that the 
predominant technologies became more flexible and uncertain than in the Fordist era (Piore and Sabel, 
1984). 
 This change radically altered the trade-off between control and delegation of autonomy, so that the 
granting of autonomy was to become no longer the exception, a privilege attained mainly by 
professional workers and a managerial elite; rather, the ideal was one of flattened hierarchies and 
devolved control. 
2
 In certain strands of sociological theory, skill is defined as constituted partly by autonomy, and partly 
by job complexity. See Spenner (1990) for a methodological review. 
3
 Both academic and popular management theorists urge employers to harness this commitment (e.g. 
Walton, 1985; Peters, 1992). The net effect on output and labour turnover of firm-specific utility is the 
same as that of firm-specific human capital, the only difference being that commitment affects effort 
while firm-specific human capital is normally conceived as raising output per unit of effort.  
4
 High-skilled professional occupations  (e.g. doctors and academics) typically advocate their own 
autonomy, referring to its productive value for their employers. The potential downside of such 
autonomy normally has to be pointed out by others.   
5
 The alternative in this context might be to link performance with pay, if suitable instruments are 
available to employers to measure performance; but to keep things simple I have abstracted from other 
forms of motivation 
6
 This restriction follows from the paper‟s focus on organisational commitment, in respect of which 
respondents are questioned about the loyalty to the organisation they work for. The potential ambiguity 
as to what is meant by the organisation they work for is of possible concern in the case of public sector 
workers. 
7
  
8
 In a multi-variate analysis, including all variables normally included in such an analysis, discretion 
was also by far the most important variable to have an association with job satisfaction. 
9
 The full Organizational Commitment Questionnaire, which is a 15-item scale, correlates highly with 
the Affective Commitment Scale (Allen and Meyer, 1990). 
10
 The weights do not account for the possibility that the propensity to participate in the survey is 
related in unknown ways to workplace discretion. 
11
 The 2006 Skills Survey, now in the field, will afford an opportunity for a comprehensive 
confirmation or refutation of this finding. 
12
 As an alternative I inputted this variable as four dummy variables. In an OLS regregression 
discretion rose monotonically across commitment levels. For the analysis shown here, however, a 
simple commitment variable ranging from 1 to 5 is entered directly, in order to faclitate computation of 
the IV estimates in column (2). 
13
 It is possible that managers who report that teams allow workers to jointly decide about work tasks 
may have an upward biased view of the amount of individual discretion that workers have, or that they 
might conflate individual and team discretion. 
14
 These latter alternative specifications are not reproduced in full here, to save space, but are available 
on request to the author. 
